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SUMMARY 
Recent studies show that the EU pharmaceutical sector is losing competitiveness in comparison 
with the US sector. This has incited debates about adverse side effects of parallel trade on future 
R&D. 
   In this regard, this thesis tries to examine the possible justifications of restrictions on parallel 
trade in the frame of EU competition rules. The thesis starts with the description of parallel trade 
itself and compares two jurisdictions, namely the EU and the US with respect to parallel trade in 
pharmaceuticals.  This comparison shows different policy goals the EU is faced with, which 
motivates the legality of parallel trade and directs the CJEU to protect it in order to achieve the 
market integration. 
   The subsequent chapter analyzes important case-law of the pharmaceutical sector concerning 
restrictions on parallel trade within the EU competition rules. It discusses the emergence of a 
new trend while assessing the legality of restrictions on parallel trade; by looking at R&D, 
consumer well-fare arguments, as well as the specificity of pharmaceutical industry based on 
price control through state intervention. 
   The final chapter discusses pros and cons of parallel trade from an economic perspective; this 
helps to consider how pharmaceutical companies can use these arguments to justify restriction on 
parallel trade in light of the EU Court’s case-law, taking into consideration the trend suggested 
by the EU Courts, and fit them in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
   Finally, a conclusion is drawn, that the EU Courts are cautions to accept different treatment of 
the pharmaceutical sector. However, it is suggested that the EU Courts would open doors for the 
justification of restrictions on parallel trade, but only if a direct link between parallel trade and 
loss in long-run dynamic efficiency is proven by a pharmaceutical company. Furthermore, this 
will be done only on a case by case basis in order to not sacrifice the goal of achieving an 
internal market, where the competition rules play an important role. In the light of this 
conclusion, pharmaceutical companies when thinking of minimizing the risks of competition 
concerns are advised to consider the important trends and aspects of EU case-law. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There are ongoing debates about pros and cons of parallel trade in the pharmaceutical sector, 
among both economists and lawyers. Consequently, there are different approaches to this issue 
across the world.  
   In the European Union (EU) parallel trade is not only allowed but rather is promoted and 
protected, since it serves the aim of achieving a single internal market based on the principle of 
free movement of goods. Contrary, in the United States (US), parallel trade of pharmaceuticals is 
prohibited, since the integration is not a market goal of the US, as it follows federalist structure. 
Parallel trade is not always a profitable thing, especially for pharma industry. Thus, in order to 
eliminate parallel trade, pharmaceutical companies tend to adopt different practices such as dual 
pricing, refusal to supply, quotas, export bans, etc.  
   In the EU a regional exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) ensures the legality of 
parallel trade and the CJEU protects it by virtue of competition rules for the proper functioning 
of the internal market.  
   Thus, this thesis addresses these issues, i.e. whether parallel trade by pharmaceutical 
companies can be justified in the ambit of EU competition rules. The possible justification of 
restraints on parallel trade lies in the triangle of competition law, Intellectual Property (IP) 
protection and EU integration. Hence, the problem of achieving a balance among them during 
the enforcement of competition rules is recognized as an underlying thought throughout the 
thesis. 
1.1. Purpose 
This thesis aims to examine whether the restrictions of parallel trade by pharmaceutical 
companies can be accommodated within the ambit of EU competition rules.  
   The questions below paves way to the research subject and serves as an auxiliary to the core 
question: What is parallel trade as such? What is the legal stand of parallel trade in two different 
systems? What are the incentive factors of parallel trade in pharmaceutical industry and the 
adverse impact on Research and Development (R&D)? What is the European Courts and 
Advocate Generals’ (AGs) position concerning the parallel trade restrictions by pharmaceutical 
companies? What are pros and cons of parallel trade in the light of short term economic 
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efficiency and long-run consumer welfare? And, how can pharmaceutical companies defend the 
restrictions on parallel trade under the EU competition rules?  
 
1.2. Method and Material 
In order to achieve the purpose of this paper traditional legal method and comparative method 
are employed. 
   Traditional legal method involves primarily the review of case-law, with focus on case-law of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU); the commentary of judgments by the 
General Court (GC) and the CJEU is supplemented with opinions of AGs, in order to analyze 
existing situations in the researched field and detect future possible developments. The thesis 
does not analyze deeply the classical sources such as European primary and secondary legal 
texts, but rather touches upon them when necessary. 
    Comparative analysis between the US and the EU system are conducted in order to understand 
the rationale of different approaches adopted by two jurisdictions. Conclusions are drawn 
bearing in mind crucial differences and significant departures of the two jurisdictions.  
   Economic perspective plays an important role in whole discussion, and hence, economic 
considerations are touched upon as an influential factor in the decision making at legal level.  
Specifically, it is assessed and decided whether the EU Courts consider economic factors while 
dealing with the restriction of parallel trade of pharmaceuticals as an anticompetitive action. 
   In addition much data of non-legal nature is also provided to accurately describe all relevant 
aspects of the pharmaceuticals market in an attempt to cover the area as comprehensively as 
possible. Due regard will be given to the reports and researches done by European Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) in various studies, which will provide much of 
the background information. 
 
1.3. Delimitations 
This thesis is written bearing in mind an assumption, that the readers possess basic knowledge of 
EU law and EU competition law principles.  
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   The thesis aims to discuss parallel trade from EU competition law perspective, however, does 
not go into depth of doctrines around Article 102 TFEU, such as refusal to license or essential 
facility doctrines and the relevant case-law. Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are discussed only with 
respect to parallel trade cases in pharmaceutical field. 
   The thesis provides some comparative analysis in light of the US system, as a support to 
understand the rationale for allowing parallel trade in Europe. Thus, comparison will be mainly 
restricted to only with the legal status and influential factors of parallel trade in the US. 
  Since the concentration on IP law is not the purpose of this thesis, the background to IP law is 
not provided. Rather, IPRs are only referred and considered as far as it concerns the balance 
between the risks and rewards of innovation. 
  Free movement of goods and the achievement of an internal market as an aim of the EU are 
dealt as far as it concerns parallel trade; however the detailed analysis on this issue is not 
conducted. 
  As one could think, the discussion on parallel trade almost always brings generics in to the 
topic; however, a delimiting line should be drawn here and said that generics fall outside the 
scope of this thesis.  In addition, the issue and legality of repackaging of pharmaceuticals and the 
trade mark law are also not discussed. 
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2. PARALLEL TRADE 
2.1. Parallel trade in general and exhaustion of IPRs  
Parallel trade is a resale of goods between countries without the authorization of the owner of the 
IPRs connected to those goods.
1
 However, parallel trade does not include unofficial or illegal, 
activities that may take place inside a country or among countries. Furthermore, it is not a trade 
in pirated or counterfeit products. Parallel imports are genuine products that do not violate IP 
rights.
2
 
   The cause of parallel trade is price discrimination, ‘whereby an identical product is sold at 
different prices in different countries’.3 
   From a legal perspective parallel trade raises question such as to what extent should countries 
allow or restrict the ability of IPRs holders to control the movement of products across different 
markets on the basis of local ownership of IPRs.
4
  
   Indeed, parallel imports have been admitted in many countries on a regional or international 
scale.
5
  The TRIPS Agreement itself, gives the World Trade Organization (WTO) members the 
freedom to design their own regimes of IPR exhaustion.
6
 
There exist three types of exhaustion all over the world.  National exhaustion: exclusive rights of 
IPR holders cease after the first sale of the product within national borders. According to this 
type of exhaustion IPR holders can stop parallel imports from entering the local market, even 
though their rights are exhausted in that market. This may for example be seen in the US.7  
   Regional exhaustion operates in the same way as national exhaustion. It has consequences in 
the territories of several countries that form a trade region.
8
 This means that parallel trade is 
                                                          
1
 Margaret K. Kyle, ‘Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuticals: firm response and Competition Policy’ in Barry Hawk (ed), 
International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Competition Law 2009 (Juris Publishing 2010), ch 13, 339. 
2
 Duncan Matthews and Viviana Munoz-Tellez, ‘Parallel Trade: A User’s Guide’ in A Krattiger and other (eds), 
Intellectual Property Management in Health and Agricultural Innovation: A Handbook of Best Practices (MIHR: 
Oxford, U.K., and  PIPRA: Davis, U.S.A.), Ch 15.4,1429, <http://www.iphandbook.org/handbook/ch15/p04/ > 
accessed 5 April 2013. 
3
 Kyle (n 1) 339. 
4
 Matthews and Viviana Munoz-Tellez (n 2) 1432. 
5
 Carlos Correa, Integrating Public Health Concerns into Patent Legislation in Developing Countries  (South Centre: 
Geneva,2000), 74,<http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/h2963e/h2963e.pdf>, accessed 5 April 2013. 
6
 The Agreements on Trade Related-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, signed in Marakesh, Morocco 
on Aprril 15
th
 1994, Article 6. 
7 Matthews and Viviana Munoz-Tellez (n 2) 1432. 
8
 WIPO Secretariat, ‘Interface Between Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Law’, CDIP/4/4 
REV./STUDY/INF/2, June 12011, 5. 
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allowed within the region, however right holders can ban the import from the countries outside 
the region, and the perfect example of such a regime is the EU. 
   Finally there is an International exhaustion, where IPR holders’ rights over products cease 
after the first sale in any market. Thus, IPR holders cannot block parallel imports from entering 
the local market. This system is adopted by Kenya.
9
 
 
2.2. Parallel trade in Europe as a means for integration  
In order to achieve the establishment of a single European market any quantitative restrictions or 
measures having equivalent effect are prohibited by virtue of Article 34 TFEU and following the 
seminal case Cassis de Dijon.
10
  Thus, conflict between exercise of IPRs and free movement of 
goods has been resolved on the basis of the principle of regional exhaustion of IPRs. The 
principle of regional exhaustion derives from Articles 34 and 36 TFEU, as well the case 
Deutsche Grammophon/Metro.
11
 In this case a German undertaking, owner of a copyright, used 
its exclusive right of distribution to prohibit the import of sound recordings from France to 
Germany. 
   The CJEU stated that while the existence of an IPR is protected, the exercise of an IPR may 
violate the rules enshrined in the Treaty. Particularly, when such exercise runs against the free 
movement of goods, justification should be considered on the basis of the grounds contained in 
Article 36 TFEU. This article, being an exception to the paradigm of free movement, should 
apply as long as this derogation is indispensable to protect the rights. 
This paved the way to legality of parallel trade in the EU. Protection of parallel trade is evident 
in the early case-law for example in Hoffmann-La Roche.
12
 The CJEU ruled that a trade mark 
owner may not prevent a parallel importer from repackaging a good if this is necessary for him 
to be able to sell it in another Member State. 
                                                          
9
 Matthews and Viviana Munoz-Tellez (n 2) 1432. 
10
 Case120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649.  
11
 Case78/70 Deutsche Grammophon GmbH v. Metro-SB-Groomarkte GmbH & Co. KG [1971] ECR 487. 
12
 Case 102/77 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse 
mbH [1978] ECR 1139.  
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   This approach is now supported by the secondary legislation such as the Trade Mark Directive 
13
, particularly Article 7, which enshrines the principle of ‘exhaustion of rights’ at an European 
Economic Area (EEA)-wide level. Moreover, the CJEU made it clear that Member States are no 
longer free to opt for an international exhaustion.
14
 
   In the light of the foregoing, parallel trade is absolutely legal in the EU. Furthermore, it 
constitutes ‘a central facet of the integration of European economies and is strongly encouraged by 
the European Institutions.’15  
 
2.3. Comments and transition   
Even though parallel trade is now at an advanced stage in Europe, there still remains the question 
of its absolute protection in pharmaceutical sector. While parallel trade is accepted as a means 
for integration which upholds the foundation of the EU and serves the aim of a single Union 
market, it is not necessarily beneficial to all industries. Thus, the possibility for the 
pharmaceutical companies to justify the restraints on parallel trade in the triangle of integration 
through parallel trade, competition and IP laws is not straightforward.  
   Above descriptive section paves the way to discuss and compare parallel trade in 
pharmaceuticals in two different jurisdictions the EU and the US which recognize respectfully, 
regional and national exhaustion of IPRs. This comparison serves the aim of understanding the 
rationale behind the different approach and why the US system will not work in the EU.  
In addition, during the comparison, the specific nature of pharmaceutical market is taken into 
consideration, which makes this industry sensible to parallel trade and hence, requires more 
cautious approach.  
 
 
  
                                                          
13 Directive 2008/95/EC of 22 October 2008 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks 
[2008] OJ L299/25. 
14
 See Case C-355/96 Silhouette International Schmied GmbH & Co. KG v Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH 
[1998] ECR I-4799 with respect Trademark directive, paras 22-27. 
15
 Melanie Farquharson and  Vincent Smith, Parallel Trade in Europe (Sweet & Maxwell 1998). 
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3. PARALLEL TRADE IN PHARMACEUTICALS IN EUROPE 
AND THE US  
3.1. Single pharmaceutical market in the EU  
In order to assess the intersection of competition and IP laws for the purposes of parallel trade a 
good understanding of the way pharmaceutical sector functions is needed. To this end, this 
section commences with an overview of functioning of the pharmaceutical market in the EU. 
In order to ensure the consumer protection, clinical tests and a prior authorization systems are 
required before any products could be lawfully marketed, making this  industry one of the most 
regulated both in the EU and at the National Level. Each Member State had their own marketing 
and approval authorization for pharmaceuticals, which created obstacles to free movement of 
drugs in the Union. 
   The first steps to remove these obstacles and create one system were adoption of a few 
Directives
16
 that introduced a procedure for the mutual recognition of national marketing 
authorizations in different Member States. Finally, ‘the Commission outlined an industrial policy 
program that led to the creation of the European Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA) and to 
the establishment of new harmonized procedures to obtain a marketing authorization.’17 EMEA’s 
mission statement is “to promote the protection of human health… and of consumers of 
medicinal products”. 18 This goal is to be achieved through a greater level of harmonization of 
pharmaceutical regulation within the EU. Hence, now, there are three different procedures to 
obtain a marketing authorization for pharmaceutical products:
19
a) The National Procedure, b) 
The Mutual Recognition and Decentralized Procedure, c) The Centralized Procedure.  
                                                          
16
 Council Directive 65/65/EEC of 26 January 1965 on the approximation of provisions laid down by Law, 
Regulation or Administrative Action relating to proprietary medicinal products [1965] OJ 369/65;  Council 
Directive 75/318/EEC of 20 May 1975 on the approximation of the laws of Member States relating to analytical, 
pharmaco-toxicological and clinical standards and protocols in respect of the testing of proprietary medicinal 
product [1975] OJ L147/1; Second Council Directive 75/319/EEC of 20 May 1975 on the approximation of 
provisions laid down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action relating to proprietary medicinal products [1975] 
OJ L147/13.  
17
 Claudia Desogus, ‘Competition and Innovation in the EU Regulation of Pharmaceuticals: The case of parallel 
Trade,’39 <http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/19408/Proefschrift%20Claudia%20Desogus.pdf>accessed 6 April 2013. 
18
 See Council Regulation (EC) 2309/93 of 22 July 1993 laying down Community procedures for the authorization 
and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European Agency for the 
evaluation of Medicinal Products [1993] OJ L214. 
19
 Desogus (n17) 39. 
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   The third procedure serves the aim of single pharmaceutical market and facilitates free 
movement of pharmaceuticals all over the EU; as it is centralized and entirely managed by 
EMEA. It allows companies to have a unique authorization valid within the whole territory of the 
EU. 
3.1.1. Fragmentation of the market through price differences  
Although progress has been made in the past years in harmonization of the pharmaceutical 
markets, the pricing decisions have continued to be operated on a national basis, which results in 
price differences across the Member States.
20‘A single pharmaceutical market process has been 
distracted by the considerable fragmentation of the national markets with different pricing 
regulations and reimbursements.’21 
   Price difference across the countries in the EU is caused on one hand by the national price 
control mechanism and on the other hand by the pharmaceutical companies, pricing their 
products according to the ability of the consumer to pay in the particular market, aiming to 
obtain the highest price each market can bear. This creates price differences among the Member 
States, which is the result of an interplay between private and public interests. The way in which 
this balance is struck between opposing interests varies from country to country, depending on 
the health care system, on the industrial policy pursued, reimbursement policy etc.,
22
 as well, on 
the health status of the citizens, on medical culture etc.
23
  
   In addition almost all EU countries except Germany and the UK apply direct price controls to 
on-patent drugs.
24
 
   Traditionally, Northern European countries, counting on higher income per capita, always 
opted for health care policies allowing for free pricing of medicinal specialties, in order to 
promote the growth of in-house pharmaceutical industry; contrary, in Southern European 
                                                          
20
 Aysegul Timur and Gabriel Picone, ‘Regulating The Pharmaceutical Industry in the European Union: A Dilema of 
Achieving of Single Market’, (International Business & Economics Research Journal - July 2010) Volume 9, 
Number 7, 29.< http://journals.cluteonline.com/index.php/IBER/Article/view/595/581>accessed 9 April 2013. 
21
 Ibid 30. 
22
 Desogus (n 17)41. 
23
 See in this regard: Stuart O. Sschweitzer, Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy (Oxsfor University press 2007). 
24
 Timur and Picone (n 20) 30. Direct price controls include negotiated prices, price-caps (fixed maximum price), 
cost-plus prices, price comparison etc. 
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countries, with lower income per capita, aimed at directly monitoring prices of medicines, in 
order to keep health care expenses under control.
25
 
   The significant price difference in pharmaceutical industry across the EU creates the 
fragmentation of the market. Therefore according to some commentators it is impossible to speak 
of a single market for pharmaceuticals.
26
 Many times the CJEU
27
 and the European Parliament
28
 
called on the Commission and the Council to remedy distortions caused from price differentials. 
However, drugs pricing and related decisions are still under exclusive national competence.
29
 
   The national price control not only results in fragmentation of the pharmaceutical market but as 
well facilitates the parallel trade in the Union as a main incentive factor.  
   The price differences resulting from the price control creates a ground for parallel trade, which 
is protected by the free movement principle. Whether price control itself is a measure equivalent 
to quantitative restrictions will be briefly examined below.  
   Following Roussel 
30
, the price control as such is not contrary to free movement of goods, as 
long as it is not applied in a discriminatory manner. Although negative attitude towards 
discriminatory measures is not absolute, in Decker
31
 the CJEU stated that even the rule of prior 
authorization encouraged buying products in Luxemburg rather in other Member State and was 
discriminatory; it could have been justified by the risk of seriously undermining the financial 
balance of social security system. 
                                                          
25
 See: Panos Kanavos, ‘Overview of pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement regulation in Europe’,13–
19,<http://www.eco.uc3m.es/servicios/sesam/actividades/jornada_legislacion/DOC%209%20EMEARoadMap.pdf >  
accessed 5 April 2013. 
26
 Mellanie and Smith, (n 15) 68, affirming that the pharmaceutical  industry is a ‘sector where the creation of a 
single European market is highly unlikely to occur even in the medium to long term due to the interest of national 
governments in controlling spending on pharmaceuticals.’ 
27
 See Case 15/74Centrafarm BV and Adriaan de Peijper v Sterling Drug Inc [1974] ECR 114,para. 23. 
28
 See the EU Parliament’s Resolution on the Communication from the Commission on the Single Market in 
Pharmaceuticals [1999] OJ C279/79. 
29
 See the Commission, ‘Communication on Single Market in Pharmaceuticals’ COM(98)588 final, p. 7-8, 12, 18, 
where the Commission affirms that these matters are mostly within the exclusive competence of the Member States 
and, pursuant to the principle of subsidiarity, should be left to national authorities; See as well Para. 1 of Art. 168 
TFEU, reads as follows: “The Union action shall respect the responsibilities of the Member States for the definition 
of their health policy and for the organization and delivery of health services and medical care. The responsibilities 
of the Member States shall include the management of health services and medical care and the allocation of the 
resources assigned to them. 
30
 Case 181/82 Roussel Laboratoria BV and others v État néerlandais [1983]ECR 3849. 
31
 Case C-120/95 Nicolas Decker v Caisse de maladie des employés privés [1998] ECR 1831, para36, 39. 
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   It is clear from the line of the case-law that differences between national health care systems 
are not considered as obstacles to the free movement of goods.
32
 
   In conclusion, the price control in Member States creates the fragmentation of the 
pharmaceutical market; however they are not measures hindering free movement of goods. 
Moreover, it creates the situation which facilitates the parallel trade and by protecting parallel 
trade the EU achieves the aim of an internal market. Before, turning to parallel trade in 
pharmaceuticals in the EU and the US precisely, some overview of pharmaceutical sector in the 
EU with some comparison with the US industry focused on figures will be touched upon below. 
 
3.2. EU pharmaceutical industry in figures 
The pharmaceutical industry in terms of production, revenue generation and employment is one 
of the best-performing high-technology industries in Europe.  
   According to the latest estimates, the pharmaceutical industry in 2011 provided about 660,000 
units of employment in Europe, of which 116,000 are devoted to R&D.
33
 
   According of the EEPIA 2012 report the research-based pharmaceutical industry can play a 
critical role in restoring Europe to growth. In 2011 it invested an estimated € 27,500 million in 
R&D in Europe and research-based pharmaceutical industry is a key asset of the European 
economy.
34
 
   However, European pharmaceutical market is losing competitiveness in regard to its main 
competitor, the US.
35
 Moreover, there is rapid growth in the market and research environment in 
emerging economies such as Brazil, China and India, resulting in further migration of economic 
and research activities outside of Europe to these fast-growing markets.
36
 
   The graph below
37
 shows that Europe compared to the US is quite behind when it comes to the 
investment in R&D.  
                                                          
32
 See Panos Kanavos, ‘The Single Market for Pharmaceuticals in the European Union in Light of European Court 
of Justice Rulings,’ (Pharmacoeconomics2000) Volume 18, Issue 6,523-532.< 
http://link.springer.com/journal/40273> accessed 7 April 2013. 
33
 See EFPIA, ‘The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures’, (2012) ,< http://www.efpia.eu/pharmaceutical-industry-
figures-edition-2012> accessed 10 April 2013. 
34
 Ibid. 
35 Desogus (n17)32. 
36
 EFPIA(n 33) 9. 
37
 EFPIA (n 33) 5. 
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Parallel trade was estimated to amount to € 5,100 million (value at ex-factory prices) in 2010. 38It 
generally deprives the industry of additional resources to fund R&D. Hence, in order to maintain 
the competitiveness of EU pharmaceutical industry, parallel trade should be treated carefully, so 
as to not remove the incentive for R&D. 
 
 3.3. Parallel trade of pharmaceuticals in the EU 
The Commission reaffirmed in its communication in 1998 that pharmaceuticals are fully 
governed by the rules for functioning of the internal market.
39
  Later, in 2003 parallel trade was 
recognized as a legal form of trade among Members States.
40
 
                                                          
38
 Ibid 4. 
39
 Commission,‘Communication n on the single market in pharmaceuticals’ (Communication) COM (1998) 588. 
40
 See Commission, ‘Communication on parallel imports of proprietary medicinal products for which marketing 
authorizations have already been granted’ COM (2003) 839. 
12 
 
   Price difference on pharmaceutical products is a main incentive of parallel trade, which results 
the flow of pharmaceuticals from Southern European countries such as Spain and Italy, where 
the prices on pharmaceutical products are relatively low compared to Northern European 
Countries as for Denmark, Sweden and the UK.  
   Parallel trading is flexible, since it includes little capital investment, parallel traders as 
entrepreneurs have no long term concerns for the industry. They have no R&D programmes, and 
they make a regular use of the Courts including the CJEU.
41
 
In addition, parallel trade is facilitated by the centralized system of market authorization. When a 
directly distributed product is approved centrally by the Commission, following a positive 
opinion from the EMEA and in accordance with Regulation
42
, no further regulatory approval is 
required if the product is identical in every Member State. 
   However, there still could be some impediments to parallel traders such as: a linguistic 
compliance check on the pack labeling according to Article 76(3) of the Directive 27/2004/EC,
43
 
importers are required to notify the full marketing authorization holder and the competent 
authority in the Member State of destination of their intention to parallel distribute a product. In 
addition, under trademark law, the importer must also notify the trademark owner. These 
requirements can be considered as obstacles for parallel trade. 
   In addition to already mentioned factors, parallel trade is encouraged as well through the 
regional exhaustion of the IPRs in Europe and this is itself connected to the patent protection 
which does not allow any other competition such as generic products. Thus, the only form of 
competition is parallel trade during the patent lifespan. 
Comments:  
To sum up, the above factors can be organized in the following way: a) factors making parallel 
trade of pharmaceuticals legal and possible and b) factor which influences legality as well as 
ease parallel trade.   
   Regional exhaustion of IPRs is one of the aspects which make parallel trade legal while 
pharmaceutical product is still protected by patent. Price differences are driving factors which 
                                                          
41
 REMIT Consultants, Impediments to parallel trade in pharmaceuticals within the European community, ( the 
study was carries out under a contract with the Commission) ( Luxemburg 1992),5. 
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[2004] OJ L136/1. 
43
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incite parallel trade and promise profit to parallel traders. Centralized system of marketing 
authorization at EU level makes parallel trading of pharmaceuticals at the same time legal and as 
well easy to be conducted. 
   In the next section, parallel trade of pharmaceuticals in the US will be analyzed and compared 
with EU system. 
 
3.4. Parallel trade of pharmaceuticals in the US  
Exhaustion of IPRs is not a straightforward issue in the US, since no Court has ruled specifically 
on the issue of national vs. international exhaustion of IPRs.  
   According to Rebecca Eisenberg, ‘the US bargaining position, supported by the pharmaceutical 
industry, has been that every nation should follow a rule of national exhaustion. But it is not at 
all clear that this is the law in the US.’44  
   The issue is not clear not only regarding the pharmaceuticals but concerning all industries as 
well. In order to understand whether the US allows parallel trade in pharmaceuticals the 
exhaustion of IPRs in general should be reviewed.  
   Exhaustion of IPRs is unclear when it comes to copyrights also. On one hand, the section 
602(a) of the copyright act in the US reads: 
[I]mportation into the United States, without the authority of the 
owner of copyright under this title, of copies or phonorecords of a 
work that have been acquired outside the United States is an 
infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies or 
phonorecords.
45
 
  But, on the other hand, in the case Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research 
International, Inc 
46
 the US Supreme Court limited the rights of copyright holders to prevent 
parallel trade and is consistent with international exhaustion of copyrights. This case concerned 
parallel trade in products first manufactured in the US and then exported.  Contrary, the 9th 
Circuit Court of Appeals stated explicitly that the “first-sale” doctrine did not apply in Omega, 
                                                          
44
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Research and Development’, (Fordham Law Review2003) volume72, issue 33, 485 
<http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol72/iss3/1/> accessed 25 March 2013. 
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S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corporation,
47
 which involved importation into the US of watches 
manufactured in Switzerland (with the US copyright).  
   However, trademark owners have the right to prevent parallel trade.
48
 Similarly, the patent act 
states that ‘whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the 
United States during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent.’49 Thus, the US patents 
owners can claim the infringement and through it prevent the unauthorized imports of their 
products.  
   In Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corp. v. United Aircraft Eng’g Corp.50 the Court ruled that 
because the patent owner had not expressly forbidden resale into the US by its licensee, the 
patent owner could not prevent parallel trade. While in Jazz Photo v. International Trade 
Commission
51
 the Court reestablished that US patent owners could claim infringement by the 
import of goods legally purchased abroad, stating that ‘[T]o invoke the protection of the first sale 
doctrine, the authorized first sale must have occurred under the US patent.’ 
   In order to analyze the legal stand of parallel trade of Pharmaceuticals in the US only 
exhaustion rule alone would not help rather safety of importation should be considered as well. 
Unlike the EU market, here we are dealing with the importation from different countries which 
can have the different safety requirements from the US.  
   Thus, parallel trade in pharmaceuticals is somewhat complicated in the US by the Federal 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and its amendments. The primary concern of this Act is safety, 
rather than exhaustion of IPRs and there are a number of provisions relevant to the import of 
pharmaceutical products. Only the US manufacturer of a pharmaceutical has the right to import 
that product into the US.
52
 Imports of foreign pharmaceuticals may not have Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approval, which is specific to the manufacturer location, formulation, 
specification of the active ingredients, labeling, and many other features.
53
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   Following to the President Obama’s agenda to make healthcare cheaper in March 2009  ‘A bill 
to amend the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act with respect to the importation of 
prescription drugs, and for other purposes’ was introduced and referred to the US Senate  with 
respecting committees. The Bill aimed to address the current situation under which the US 
consumers are charged some of the world’s highest prices for prescription drugs. The Bill would 
have allowed US-licensed pharmacies and wholesalers to import FDA-approved medications 
from Canada, Europe and elsewhere. The legislation would have included further provisions to 
prevent pharmaceutical companies from obstructing trade, such as slightly altering formulations 
to prevent them from being imported or failing to supply Canadian pharmacies.
54
  However the 
Bill was not enacted and was sent back to the committee.
55
 
   The same fate was shared with the Bill introduced later on February 10, 2011 by the senator 
Olympia Snow.
56
 This indicates unsuccessful attempts to allow parallel trade of pharmaceutical 
from outside in the US. 
   Even though that parallel trade in pharmaceuticals is not allowed or is rendered to be difficult 
in the US, it still appears through the backdoor via internet sales and threatens the profitability of 
the US pharmaceutical companies and has long-run implications to this end. 
 
3.5. Comparison and discussion 
The comparison concerning the parallel trade of pharmaceuticals showed some similarities and 
disparities. In both jurisdictions parallel trade is encouraged by the price differences, in Europe 
between southern European and Northern European Countries and regarding the US low prices 
in Canada play an influential role. However, unlike the EU the price is not the result of 
negotiations between pharmaceutical companies and government authorities in the US. Thus, 
this could work for pro parallel traders to defend it under the US jurisdiction. While in the EU 
pharmaceutical companies are asking the restriction of parallel trade on the basis that market is 
different from other sectors, since it is not governed by the principles of pure supply and 
demand. 
                                                          
54
 CMS, ‘European Parallel Trade Review ‘ (2011),29< http://www.cmslegal.com/European-Parallel-Trade-Review-
2011-05-03-2011> accessed 5 March 2013. 
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   One of the main factors to not allow parallel imports in the US is the safety reasons and this 
can be clearly explained by the difference between the EU and the US constitutional structure. In 
the EU we are speaking about one European market which has the centralized system of 
authorization and safety protection, while in the US, this cannot be achieved since parallel trade 
is conducted from another country which has separate and different authorization system 
regarding drugs. Therefore, the US has legitimate right to restrict parallel trade for the sake of 
consumers’ health protection.  
   Another difference detected, is that for the EU parallel trade is a means to remove obstacles 
and create one single market.  The establishment of an internal market is at heart of the European 
Union, according to the Article 3(3) TFEU. The Lisbon Treaty has considerably broadened the 
foundations and the goals of the European unification setting up of an area without internal 
frontiers.
57
  
   The same goals and challenges are not facing the US, due to the fact that the US is a federalist 
state, while the Union is not a state as such and aims to achieve economic cooperatation between 
Member States.   
   Thus, as the state, the US can ban the parallel trade for the sake of protection of national 
market and profitability of pharmaceutical companies. As increasing numbers of US retail 
consumers have turned to Canadian-based internet pharmacies, the profit margins 
pharmaceutical companies enjoy have fallen.
58
  
   However, the protection of national markets in the EU cannot be accepted as a justification if it 
includes the discrimination of products originated from the other members states and will be 
against the free movement rules. 
   Notwithstanding  different approaches to parallel trade  in two jurisdiction, the problem caused 
by it to the pharmaceutical companies remain the same; which is the threat to profitability 
reflected later on the R&D funding. 
   The EU is aware of the specificity of pharmaceutical sector. The Commission has recognized 
the particularities of the market in its Communication outlining an industrial policy for the 
pharmaceutical sector in the European Community:  
                                                          
57
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   The pharmaceutical market is not a normal market. Companies channel competitive efforts into 
therapeutic innovation and continued improvements to existing products. ‘Competition between 
companies focuses on therapeutic innovation. Promotion activities with health professionals play 
a key role. Enterprises are therefore often less concerned about competing on prices, and rather 
concentrate on their costs, finances and sales volumes.’59 
   Thus, the manufacturers of the pharmaceuticals have no reason to make life easy for parallel 
traders. They need to protect the future of their industry, which requires a 10-15 year horizon in 
developing new drugs.
60
 Moreover, on average only one or two of every 10,000 substances 
synthesized in laboratories, will successfully pass all the stages to become marketable 
medicines.
61
 This means that the successful one out of 10000 substances, should recoup the 
investment and costs incurred not only for it but for the rest unsuccessful 9999. This indicates the 
sensitivity of pharmaceutical industry to parallel trade. 
   It was argued that Canadian internet trade may have reduced global drug manufacturer profits 
by roughly 1%. While this amount seems small over time this could have an impact on the speed 
of development of new useful medicines
62
. 
   Therefore, pharmaceutical companies try to justify restriction on parallel trade on the basis to 
invest in R&D.  This is discussed below within the ambit of EU competition rules and in light of 
respecting case-law. 
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4. EU COMPETITION LAW IN PARALLEL TRADE CASES 
4.1. Intersection between IPRs and Competition Law  
Even though, competition and IP laws share the same policy goal to promote innovation for the 
sake of better products being developed, a tension arises between them
63
, since EU competition 
rules provide an external system of regulation that applies to anticompetitive conduct not 
prevented by the internal system of regulation offered by IP Legislation.
64
 Secondly, competition 
policy affects how IP owners may respond to parallel trade and those actions can be viewed as 
anticompetitive.
65
 
   The achievement of proper balance between enforcement of competition rules and proper 
regard to IPRs comes at stake in the pharmaceutical sector. The current stand of the Courts 
regarding the restrains on parallel trade is analyzed in light of Glaxo saga.
66
 
 
4.2 The stand of Article 101 TFEU in agreements restricting parallel trade  
The European Courts have, from and after Parke Davis,
67
established that the exclusivity right 
connected to an IPR is not itself anticompetitive under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, only where 
the IPR is used to implement an agreement restrictive of competition then the prohibition comes 
into play.
68
 
   This section discusses Article 101 TFEU in light of two cases GlaxoSmithKline Services and 
Bayer.   
4.2.1. Dual pricing to combat the parallel trade: GlaxoSmithKlein  
GlaxoSmithKline Services v Commission of the European Communities
69
 is the third in a row in 
the attempts of this firm to shake off parallel traders.
70
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   The factual background briefly is as follows: Glaxo Welcome SA (GW), a subsidiary of 
GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited (GSK), applied a differentiated price system for some 
pharmaceutical products sold to its Spanish wholesalers.  Condition on different price charged 
distinguished between lower prices in the case of domestic resale of reimbursable drugs to 
pharmacies or hospitals, and higher prices charged in the case of exports of medicines to any 
other Member State. The Commission had decided that GW had infringed Article 101(1) TFEU: 
since such a clause in an agreement must be considered to have as its object restriction of parallel 
trade as competition.  
   Both Courts GC and the CJEU dealt with the case and came to a different conclusion.  The 
GC’s decision seems more favoring GW, elaborating the application of Article 101(3) somewhat 
in detail.
71
 
   The GC disagreed with the Commission and pointed out that restriction of parallel trade is not 
per se violation of the Article 101 TFEU. Moreover, it is not sufficient to find that an agreement 
as such restricts parallel trade and partitions the common market. Rather it also requires an 
analysis designed to determine whether it has as its object or effect the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition on the relevant market, to the detriment of the final consumer.
72
 
   The GC took into consideration the specificity of the pharmaceutical market which 
distinguishes it from other industry, since the prices of the medicines concerned were to a 
significant extent shielded from “the free play of supply and demand” as they are fixed by the 
Member States directly or indirectly.
73
 According to Anderman workable competition 
presupposes that pricing mechanisms are functioning normally.
74
 This is the one characteristic 
which is not functioning “normally” in relation to competitive forces in the pharmaceutical 
market. 
   Given this particular context, the GC had determined that it could not be presumed that clause 
in the agreement imposing dual pricing system would restrict competition to the detriment of the 
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final consumer.
75
 The Spanish intermediaries might well keep the advantage in terms of price 
which parallel trade might entail, in which case the advantage would not be passed on to the final 
consumer in the first place.
76
 Since the Commission had “at no point” examined the “specific and 
essential characteristics of the sector”,77 the GC held that the presence of a restriction by object 
had not been established.
78
  
   The GC found that the Commission was correct in finding that dual pricing concerned the 
restriction of the competition by effect. However, the GC found that: 
   The Commission had failed to carry out a proper examination of Article 101(3) TFEU and had 
not substantiated its conclusion that it was not proven: (i) that parallel trade was apt to lead to a 
loss in efficiency by appreciably altering GSK's capacity for innovation; and (ii) that sales 
conditions were apt to enable a gain in efficiency to be achieved by improving innovation.
79
 
Therefore, the GC annulled its decision in that part and required a new evaluation.
80
  
   The case has been appealed by the both parties to the CJEU, which found that the GC had erred 
in law as to its interpretation of Article 101(1) TFEU.
81
 The CJEU followed the well established 
case-law by stating that “in principle,” agreements aiming at limiting parallel trade ‘have as their 
object the prevention of competition’.82 It added that this principle also applies to the 
pharmaceuticals sector.
83
  Furthermore, the CJEU stated that: there is nothing in that provision to 
indicate that only those agreements which deprive consumers of certain advantages may have an 
anti-competitive object. As well, Article 101 TFEU aims to protect not only the interests of 
competitors or of consumers, but also “the structure of the market and, in so doing, competition 
as such. […]”84 
   Regarding GSK’s request for an exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU, the CJEU agreed with 
the GC stating that the Commission failed to take into account all the relevant evidence produced 
by GSK regarding the loss in efficiency associated with parallel trade or the gain in efficiency 
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procured by the dual pricing clause, and that such decision was, for this reason, vitiated by a 
failure to carry out a proper examination.
85
 
Comments: 
Even though the CJEU stated that limitation of parallel trade was restriction by object contrary to 
the GC’s finding, both agreed on the necessity to consider the application of Article 101(3) 
TFEU.  The CJEU pointed out that an agreement should be assessed in light of factual arguments 
and evidences provided by the undertaking, in order to establish the applicability of the 
exemption under 101(3) TFEU and the burden of proof imposed on the undertaking, only 
requires to establish that the occurrence of the appreciable objective advantage is sufficiently 
likely.
86
  
   It is obvious that the Courts adopted the interpretation of the entire Article 101 TFEU in 
accordance with its economic fundamentals. However, such an economic approach has to be 
made fit to measure the dual structure that characterizes that provision. Keeping in mind the 
basic assumption that Article 101 TFEU as a whole serves to enhance consumer welfare,
87
 the 
question needs to be addressed what consumer welfare effects must be analyzed in the context of 
para (1) and respectively (3) of that provision.
88’A useful approach would be to link Article 
101(1) TFEU to the effects of an agreement on allocative inefficiency, and Article 101(3) TFEU 
to the effects of an agreement on productive and dynamic efficiency.’89 
   Thus, the presence of negative welfare effects for final consumers in terms of supply or price 
would trigger the application of Article 101(1) TFEU. However, its enactment would depend on 
analysis of possible positive welfare effects under Article 101(3) TFEU. This means that 
restrictive agreements will only be prohibited when they on balance lead to a decrease of 
consumer welfare.
90
 
   The negative aspect of the CJEU’s judgment is to bring an ambiguity regarding the purpose of 
the competition and Article 101 TFEU as such. ‘Article 101 TFEU aims to protect not only the 
interests of competitors or of consumers, but also the “structure of the market “and, in so doing, 
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“competition as such.”91 The notions:  “structure of the market” and “competition as such” in this 
context is quite puzzling. Although if we consider that these terms are referred ‘in a manner of 
which the additional goal of market integration affects the interpretation of the notion of 
restriction by object’92 the ambiguity would be cleared. Then it would be possible to say that 
according to this judgment, the CJEU is at the position that the ultimate goal of the Article 101 
TFEU is the protection of consumer welfare and it is better achieved by promoting the single 
internal market. Further market integration ensures that undertakings can and must compete in a 
bigger market. Thus it further enhances competition and consumer welfare.
93
 
   This case shows that the GC was more eager to recognize that these strategies adopted by the 
pharmaceutical companies are nothing but attempts to cope with the symptoms of a disease, 
which undermines their ability to finance the R&D essential to prevent their “product pipelines 
from running dry”.94 While the CJEU’s judgment shows that the introduction of a more 
economic approach is more easily said than done.
95
 
   However, the development of the case-law on parallel trade seems to question the traditional 
legal approach to restrictions of parallel trade: its effect on static and dynamic efficiency based 
on companies’ incentive to invest in innovation. 
4.2.2. Supply restrictions to fight parallel trade: Bayer 
The most widespread strategy used by pharmaceutical companies to cope with parallel trade is 
so-called “supply chain management” systems. It involves restricting the supply of product to a 
wholesaler to the amount corresponding to the wholesaler’s sales on the domestic market plus a 
limited margin.
96
Similar scenario was at stake in the case Bayer.
97
  
   Bayer restricted supplies to its French and Spanish wholesalers so that they had sufficient stock 
to meet only domestic demand, thus limiting their ability to export to the higher priced UK 
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market. The Commission had decided that Bayer's conduct was part of a continuum of 
commercial relations with the distributors and so constituted an agreement contrary to Article 
101 TFEU.
98
  
   The main legal issue before the Court here was that for a supply chain management system to 
be caught by Article 101 TFEU, there must be an “agreement” capable of falling within the 
scope of Article 101. The CJEU stated that: 
   The mere fact that a measure adopted by a manufacturer, which has the object or effect of 
restricting competition, falls within the context of continuous business relations between the 
manufacturer and its wholesalers is not sufficient for a finding that such an agreement exists.
99
 
Indeed, the evidence suggested that the distributors did everything possible to circumvent that 
policy. Accordingly, there was insufficient evidence to find a “concurrence of wills”, as required 
under Article 101 TFEU Bayer's policy was, in essence, a unilateral one.
100
 
   Consequently, the CJEU upheld the GC’s judgment stating that action of a non-dominant 
company Bayer to prevent the parallel trade of its product did not fall under the rules prohibiting 
restrictive agreements because Bayer's action was unilateral.
101
 
Comments: 
Contrary to the Glaxo, the application of Article 101(3) TFEU in Bayer was not considered.  As 
well the negative and positive effects to the consumer welfare in the scope of that Article was not 
discussed for a very simple reason, that Article 101 TFEU was found not to be applicable, since 
Bayer’s supply chain managements system did not constitute an agreement.  
   The welcoming outcome of this case for the pharmaceutical companies is that the CJEU did 
not accept the Commission’s attempt to stretch Article 101TFEU to catch unilateral behavior. 
Thus, attempts of pharmaceutical companies to cope with parallel trade through supply chain 
management system which does not include the “concurrence of wills,” as to say an agreement, 
would not be caught by the EU competition rules, unless a company is  a dominant. 
   Article 102 TFEU might be engaged in the similar situation when dealing with the unilateral 
conduct of a dominant company and this is discussed right below.  
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4.3. Article 102 TFEU and parallel trade of pharmaceuticals 
Actions adopted by pharmaceutical companies: dual pricing and limitation to supply entail not 
only Article 101 TFEU but also trigger Article 102 TFEU in particular circumstances. Hence, the 
role of the Article 102 TFEU is dealt in light of two cases Syfait and Sot Lelos. 
4.3.1 Limitation to supply under 102 TFEU: AG Jacobs in Syfait  v. AG Colomer  in  Sot Lélos 
Syfait
102
 follows the case Bayer in footsteps; it likewise involves a strategy adopted by 
pharmaceutical company to combat parallel trade, by limiting the supply. Contrary to the case 
Bayer this situation could have been caught under the Article 102 TFEU.   
   This section analyses AG Jacobs’ opinion in conjunction with AG Colomer’s contradicting 
opinion in the case Sot Lélos, which involved the same facts as Syfait. 
In this case, GSK stopped supplying its Greek wholesalers with its products because the 
wholesalers exported a substantial proportion of GSK's products to higher-priced Member States. 
When GSK subsequently reinstated supplies to wholesalers, it refused to meet their orders in full, 
in order to prevent parallel imports. Thus, the case concerned the extent to which unilateral 
action by a dominant pharmaceutical company to limit parallel trade constitutes an abuse of a 
dominant position and, in particular, whether it can be objectively justified.
103
   
   However, Syfait has been dismissed by the CJEU on procedural grounds, since it was referred 
by the Greek Competition authority, which did not satisfy the requirement of being a court or 
tribunal for the purposes of Article 267 TFEU.
104
 Thus, there is no judgment available on the 
merits of the case; rather we are left with valuable opinion of the AG Jacobs.   
   In Syfait AG Jacobs argued in open contrast with prior case-law under Article 102 TFEU
105
 
suggesting that a pharmaceutical company does not necessarily abuse its dominant position if it 
refuses to supply wholesalers in order to protect its commercial interests as long as an action is 
objectively justified. Jacobs summarized the case-law on refusal to supply as follows: a) 
Dominant companies may have the duty to supply where failure to do so would, for example, 
seriously disrupt competition between the company and the customer on a downstream 
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market.
106
 b) Dominant companies are not obliged to meet orders that are out of the ordinary and 
they are entitled to take reasonable steps in defence of their commercial interests.
107
 
   AG suggested to take into account the specific economic and regulatory context while 
assessing an abuse.
108
On the basis of these considerations, Jacobs found that there was no per 
se abuse by Glaxo. He went on to determine whether there was any abuse at all, but couched this 
assessment in terms of whether there was any “objective justification” for the refusal to 
supply.
109
 Jacobs put forward the following ground of objective justification:  
   The Price regulation: According to Jacobs it is impossible to ignore the pervasive and diverse 
regulation to which the pharmaceutical sector is subject both at national and Union levels and 
which, in his opinion, sets it apart from all other industries engaged in the production of 
readily traded goods. In particular, Member States intervene to limit the prices payable for 
medicinal products within their territory which leads to the price of pharmaceutical products 
varying largely between Member States. This in turn creates opportunities for parallel trade.
110
 
   AG Jacobs suggests that the economics of the innovative pharmaceutical industry is the ground 
of justification. Innovation is an important parameter of competition in the pharmaceuticals 
sector. The decision whether to invest in developing a new pharmaceutical product will 
obviously depend in part upon whether the producer expects to be able to make sufficient profits 
to recoup the cost of investment. Once the investment is made, however, that cost is sunk. It is 
therefore rational for an undertaking to supply its products on any market where the price is fixed 
above variable cost.
111
 In addition, the legal and moral obligations imposed 
on pharmaceutical manufacturers make it difficult for them to withdraw products already 
marketed in low-priced Member States.
112
 Therefore, there is a risk that, dominant 
pharmaceutical companies would delay the launch of new products in lower priced Member 
States. This would lead to a fall in the levels of output and consumer welfare generated by 
some pharmaceutical products and an even greater fragmentation of the market with different 
ranges of products available in Member States.  
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   Jacobs considering consequences of parallel trade to end consumer and purchasers 
of pharmaceutical products came to the conclusion that the benefits of parallel trade are 
ordinarily enjoyed by those who purchase the products at a lower price and parallel 
trade in pharmaceutical products does not necessarily result in price competition discernible to 
the benefit of the end consumer.
113
 Nor does parallel trade always result in price competition to 
the benefit of the national health care system which purchases pharmaceutical products, or the 
taxpayers who contribute to those funds.
114
 The price differential resulting from parallel trade is 
often absorbed by those involved in the distribution chain and rarely benefits the ultimate 
consumer.
115
 
   The opinion of AG Jacobs considers the effect of parallel trade in a long run and gives hope 
that one day prayers of pharmaceutical companies might be heard by the CJEU. 
   Proceedings in the Greek civil Courts continued in parallel. After the Athens Court of First 
Instance declared the wholesalers' allegations unfounded, an appeal was brought before the 
Athens Court of Appeals and it referred the same questions to the CJEU concerning the 
interpretation of Article 102 TFEU.  
   Four years after the AG Jacobs, AG Colomer delivered contradictory opinion.  Even though, 
Colomer disagreed with Jacobs and found that limitation of supply was an abuse of a dominant 
position, he as well refused the reading of Article 102 TFEU as a per se prohibition of abusive 
conducts and accepted the application of a rule of reason in the antitrust analysis, through 
analyzing possible efficiency gains.
116
 It seems that Colomer took more economic considerations 
into account when assessing the abuse under Art 102 and suggested three grounds of justification 
for the dominant undertakings: specificity of the market, the legitimate protection of their 
business interests, and proof of net positive economic effect. 
117
 
   Both AGs agree on that the pharmaceutical market operates somehow differently from other 
markets, since there is a strong intervention from the state side by regulating the prices. 
However, Colomer disagrees with Jacobs and suggests that price regulation does not create a 
situation capable to justify the supply restrictions, since such an intervention is balanced by the 
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strong role of pharmaceutical companies in price negotiation as they possess the patent on new 
product which can improve the health of a patient. This point is highly significant since the 
Member States are interested to get the new drugs, as it is their duty to ensure that a high-quality 
public health system is provided for patients.
118
 
   Colomer did not share Glaxo’s argument that limitation to supply is the protection of the 
legitimate business interests to recoup the investment in R&D.  According to AG, there is no 
direct negative link between the parallel trade and R&D. If the parallel importers gain from the 
situation existed it could be the fault of a pharmaceutical company as well, since they are free to 
design the distribution system; however they decided on a strategy which incorporated the Greek 
wholesalers as was considered more economically efficient and advantageous. 
   Regarding the economic efficiency argument AG Colomer stated that it is up to the dominant 
company to provide the argument about the efficiency gains from their abusive action, however 
he is at the position that such evidence has not been provided by Glaxo. 
Comments:  
Notwithstanding the fact that two AGs’ opinions on the same case delivered at different times 
seem controversial at the first sight, it cannot be said that they are radically different. The 
common conclusion to be drawn is that supply restrictions are not abusive per se and it should be 
assessed in light of positive effects. Even if AG Colomer does not agree that price intervention 
by the government should cause different treatment of the sector, he still considers that economic 
analysis should be incorporated more heavily, in order to see whether there are welfare gains 
from such an allegedly abusive action. Thus, it is clear that even Article 102 TFEU unlike its 
preceding Article 101 TFEU does not have individual exemptions, that the rule of reason 
analysis should be still considered. 
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4.4. The CJEU on the limitation to supply: Sot Lélos  
Sot Lélos kai Sia
119
 is a last word in GlaxoSmithkline saga, which began in 2000. The case 
involved the opinions of two AGs delivered in different procedures at different times, concluded 
by the CJEU Judgment at second round in 2008. 
   The CJEU started dealing with the case by repeating the importance of parallel trade: ‘parallel 
imports enjoy a certain amount of protection in Community law because they encourage trade 
and help reinforce competition’120. Thus refusal to meet the orders of an existing customer 
constitutes an abuse of the dominant position under Article 102 TFEU, when that conduct 
without any objective justification is liable to eliminate a trading party as a competitor.
121
 
   In the ambit of objective justifications the Court looked at the specificity of pharmaceutical 
market and it took the same approach as AG Colomer stating that nevertheless of state 
intervention pharmaceutical companies are able to influence the price though the negotiations. 
   The CJEU accepted that dominant company is entitled to protect its own commercial interests.   
However, a pharmaceutical company cannot refuse to provide “ordinary” orders of an existing 
customer, for the sole reason that customer exported part of the quantities ordered to other 
Member States with a higher price
122
,  however the Court seems to leave room for maneuver for 
the pharmaceutical company when the issue concerns the orders that are out of the ordinary.
123
 
Comments: 
The judgment is pragmatic and represents a partial victory for both sides of parallel trade debate 
in the pharmaceutical sector. While arrangements designed to limit parallel trade are unlikely to 
escape the application of Article 102 TFEU, the Court recognizes the ability of 
dominant pharmaceutical companies to protect legitimate commercial interests when dealing 
with parallel trade. 
124
 It states that restriction of parallel trade is not a per se abuse. Moreover, it 
should always be checked in light with objective justifications.  The main victory for a 
pharmaceutical sector is that the CJEU recognizes the freedom of the pharmaceutical company to 
refuse the orders out of ordinary.  
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   One of the concerns is that the CJEU took old is gold approach by upholding the same 
formalistic approach established in earlier case-law; and avoiding the assessment of parallel trade 
impact on R&D by stating: ‘without it being necessary to examine the argument raised by 
GSK’125, even though the analysis on this matter was long awaited and hoped that Glaxo dual 
pricing would bring some light in the debate around parallel trade. 
4.5. A new approach through efficiency gains: Analysis and discussion 
After having pursued, for almost 40 years, a policy aimed at protecting and encouraging parallel 
trade
126 
through the firm prohibition of corporate conducts that restrict exports,
127
 Union Courts 
have questioned the legal principles underpinning such a policy in the pharmaceutical sector. 
By summarizing the case-law dealt above, it is clear, that Pharmaceutical companies are capable 
of avoiding competition rules and especially Article 101 TFEU through supply management 
strategies that are specifically designed to hamper parallel trade on pharmaceuticals according to 
the case Bayer, as long as the company is not in a dominant position. Furthermore, dual pricing 
under Article 101 TFEU can be justified within the scope of Article 101(3) TFEU and in this 
regard GC’s judgment in Glaxo seems to give hope to the pharmaceutical companies. 
   The positive overarching approach of two AGs’ opinions is that application of Article 102 
depends on the rule of reason analysis, through possible efficiency gains. Unlike Article 101(3) 
there is no exemption under Article 102 TFEU
128
, thus, the presence of an objective justification 
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must be taken into account when assessing whether a conduct is abusive or not, following a 
dialectic process.
129
 
   This effect-based approach, claimed by a large number of legal and economic scholars,
36
 has 
been recently and more explicitly endorsed by the European Commission in the DG Competition 
Discussion Paper, which states that: 
 [W]hen applying the consumer welfare test, the assessment of 
dominant undertakings' conduct should consider whether such a 
conduct, besides harming consumers, also yields benefits to them. To 
this purpose, a potential reduction of consumer welfare should be 
weighed also against the possible efficiency gains resulting from that 
conduct.
130
 
   A much greater use of economic theory in antitrust analysis has enlarged the scope of the 
application of the concept of “objective justification” based on dynamic efficiency gains arising 
from anticompetitive conduct.
131
 Such a trend could open the door for the pharmaceutical 
companies to justify their actions directed against parallel trade if efficiency gains to consumer 
welfare which could overweight negative anticompetitive effects are proved. 
   However, the CJEU seems more cautious, and not as bold as AGs, by adhering to the old case-
law, by referring to United Banana case as done in case Sot lelos.
 132
 Such a vigilant approach 
from the CJEU is not straightforwardly bad, since the CJEU is aware more than anybody about 
the threat to accept different treatment for a specific industry. Most importantly the threat and 
damage which could be caused to the principle of free movement of goods, one of the main 
foundations of the EU, by accepting the restriction on parallel trade. Even though the prohibition 
contained in Article 34 TFEU cannot be invoked against undertakings, the obligation not to 
impede freedom of trade between Member States, applies to them in the form of Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU.
133
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5. Discussion 
5.1. Role of the EU competition policy in IPRs  
As already seen, the tension between competition and IPRs is obvious in the cases of parallel 
trade of pharmaceuticals. The necessity to strike the correct balance has been recognized by the 
Commission:  
….[I]intervention on competition law grounds requires careful 
considerations where the application of Article 102 TFEU would lead to 
the imposition of an obligation to supply on the dominant undertaking. 
The existence of such an obligation –even for a fair remuneration may 
undermine undertakings’ incentives to invest and innovate and, thereby, 
possibly harm consumers.
134
 
 
   According to the European Courts’ judgments, the exercise of an IPR should only be 
considered to be contrary to competition law on “exceptional circumstance.”135 Furthermore, 
Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) noted that ‘Investment in 
innovation requires a predictable legal system and, as a result, antitrust policy should be 
formulated to ensure that incentives to innovate are not unnecessarily weakened or destroyed.’136 
Gerber has studied the nature of competition law in the context of Modern history and explains 
some of the events which seem so alien in relation to pharmaceuticals.
137
According to him the 
necessity to protect competition is based on two aims: to protect normative and economic aims. 
‘Normative aims consider that particular forms of competition are valuable for society, although 
their exact nature therefore varies with the society concerned. Economic aims consider that 
desirable levels of competition, and with them the benefits of increased wealth and innovation , 
are unlikely to be attained unless the legal system protects the competitive process.’138 
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   In relation to the pharmaceutical sector, these would be a balancing of the need for these 
companies to make profits, while also being able to deliver the drugs necessary for modern 
society.
139
 
   Schumpeter argues that innovation is best served where monopoly conditions operate-since this 
is the way in which the inventor can derive the best profit incentives in order to invest in R&D in 
the future.
140
  
   Now, the thesis turns to assess the pros and cons of parallel trade in light of competition policy 
and IP considerations. The pharmaceutical sector has been at the centre of a number of recent 
controversies in EU competition law: on one hand the Commission's desire to 
encourage trade among Member States to create a single market and on the other hand the fact 
that parallel trade may undermine attempts by some national governments to reward and 
encourage investments in R&D.
141
 
 
5.2. Pros and cons of parallel trade  
In this concluding chapter economic perspective of pros and cons of parallel trade is discussed, 
especially in competition matters, where economic gains and losses are the factors to be 
considered. 
   The basic view around parallel trade is based on two arguments: first of all, parallel trade might 
reduce important ‘inter-brand’ competition between producers, but may be capable of promoting 
‘intra-brand’ competition between dealers. Secondly, parallel trade might lead to abolishment of 
geographical price discrimination. Modern economics argues that price discrimination can be 
efficient and therefore pro-competitive. In line with these two sets of arguments, new economic 
insight challenges the traditional image of the parallel trader as the “holy warrior” of the internal 
market.
142
 The arguments around parallel trade from  both sides is focused around consumer 
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well-fare, however welfare effects of parallel imports of pharmaceuticals are generally 
ambiguous
143
 and two public policy goals are analyzed through implications of intra brand 
competition and price discrimination.   
   A major long-run public policy objective is to stimulate the innovation and development of 
new medicines. In particular, pharmaceutical producers shall benefit from the higher prices of 
medicines protected by a patent, in order to be able to cover high R&D costs.
144
 On the other 
hand, public policy should also ensure broad access to affordable existing medicines in the short-
run.  
   Hence there is a trade-off between access to affordable medicines in the short-run and higher 
(monopoly) drug prices to stimulate R&D in the long-run.
145
 
5.2.1. Pros of parallel trade 
As already seen and discussed, on several occasions the CJEU as well as the Commission have 
regarded parallel trade as an acceptable conduct fulfilling free movement requirements and 
providing price competition in a market. 
   According to European Association of Euro-Pharmaceutical Companies (EAEPC), Parallel 
distribution of medicines provides significant savings to governments, health insurers and 
patients by making original, innovative medicines available at a lower cost. 
146
 The benefit from 
parallel trade can categorized as following:  
5.2.1.1. Savings –social welfare 
It is suggested that parallel trade would stimulate savings both directly and indirectly. Direct 
benefits would derive from the lower prices paid by patients, which in turn entail lower 
reimbursement costs for health care systems and lower premium for health insurance. The 
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indirect benefits may be from the competitive pressure put on manufacturers by parallel 
importers that drives down patented products prices, or decelerates their increase.147 
   Saving appears in importing countries. For instance in Ireland and Sweden - a parallel traded 
product must offer savings to the state before it is reimbursed.
148
  
   Saving can be detected in exporting countries as well.  Wholesalers in exporting countries are 
legally obliged to meet domestic demand first - in fact most countries impose, through national 
law or a voluntary code of conduct, a so-called "public service obligation"; But the distribution 
chain - wholesalers and community pharmacies - needs a certain level of income to provide the 
prompt and highly efficient service. Additional income from margins with parallel trade sales 
lessens the burden on the social healthcare system of exporting countries.
149
   
   Savings from parallel trade are reflected on the patients. Rothnie observes that ‘since the 
parallel importer will rarely incur these (pre-sales marketing and after-sales service) costs and so 
can sell more cheaply than the authorized outlets . . . . If they stop providing these services, 
though, it is quite possible that consumers would be less well off.’150 For instance: In Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, the 
majority of patients pay a share of the cost of prescribed medicines they consume, so use of 
cheaper parallel-traded products will mean lower out-of-pocket demands.
151
  
5.2.1.2. Brings competition: Intra-brand competition 
Proponents of parallel trade argue that it enhances competition. Market in pharmaceuticals 
requires the unhindered free movement of products — private companies cannot erect barriers to 
undermine this without distorting intra-brand competition. 
   European Institutions have traditionally given a certain degree of protection to parallel trade, in 
the belief that it fosters intra-brand competition and promotes integration through intrastate 
trade.
152
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   Following the views expressed by EAPEC parallel trade allows regulators to avoid 
implementing other more interventionist or market-distorting cost containment measures, giving 
wholesalers, pharmacists and patients a choice.
153
 
5.2.1.3. Generates wealth 
Pro parallel traders argue that it Generates wealth, through creating new European businesses 
and new European jobs, often in economically-deprived regions, as well boosts the infrastructure 
for production and distribution in the countries of supply, as well as increasing foreign exchange 
earnings there.
154
 Noteworthy to say that the efficiency claims advanced by the research based 
pharmaceutical industry is unsubstantiated — i.e. ‘there is no evidence that partitioning the 
common market would spur on global investment in inter-brand innovation.’155 
 
5.2.2. Cons of parallel trade 
In response to the pro parallel trade arguments discussed, this section puts forward counter 
arguments. The adverse effects of parallel trade on price discrimination and impact on incentives 
to future R&D is discussed. 
5.2.2.1. Savings: social-welfare challenged 
Profit is made by parallel traders not by consumers and this is linked to the specificity of the 
pharmaceutical market, as substitution does not operate at the level of patients. Patients are in 
fact price insensitive, as most of their pharmaceutical expenditures do not come out of their 
pocket but are covered either by the national health care system, or by private insurance. The 
reimbursement system, however, creates a departure from the classical market functioning, as 
consumers use products that an agent – the government - pays for him/her.156 However, it cannot 
be excluded that savings made by the government is eventually reflected on the individuals in the 
end through the budget distribution. Though, the measurement of such benefits is not 
straightforward, because their existence depends on features of the health care system and is not 
always immediately visible or easily accountable. 
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   The lowering of prices can be beneficial to the consumers in the imported countries; however it 
can have adverse effect on the low price, exporting countries. According to Vicien
157
  this could 
bring the result that manufacturers may instead opt for a policy of refusing to sell their products 
in the cheapest markets, or even locking manufacturing plants out which of course has knock-on 
effects on employment. Moreover, parallel trade undermines the pricing policy of other Member 
States that have opted for higher prices in order to encourage R&D.
158
 
5.2.2.2. Parallel trade v. Price discrimination 
                                          “There are no miracles from miracle drugs that people cannot afford.”159 
 
Benefits of the new drugs should be affordable to the patients, and this is the driving force for 
price negotiations with pharmaceutical companies, which results in price discrimination among 
different countries. Even though there are some concerns regarding the fairness of price 
discrimination done by monopolistic companies which is not the topic of discussion of this 
thesis, one should bear in mind that there would surely be wide support for the view that it is fair 
to apply differentiated mark-ups for patented medicines according to the ability to pay.
160
 
   Price discrimination is endangered by parallel trade. Parallel trade makes it harder for 
producers to charge different prices to consumers in different countries. Therefore, parallel trade 
is in the interest of consumers in the country of import where the ability to pay is higher,
161
 
whereas parallel trade forces the producer to raise prices in countries where the buying power is 
considerably lower. In the European market, parallel trade has therefore the tendency to 
harmonize the level of consumer prices.
162
 
   The threat posed by parallel trade to price discrimination through harmonizing the prices was 
considered by Post-Chicago school.
163
 It was suggested that if parallel trade would be allowed 
this would undermine the ability of firms to price discriminate. The reason is straightforward as 
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Demaret explains: ‘When domestic laws no longer permit import restrictions, parallel imports 
become possible between territories; it becomes unfeasible to quote different prices in each 
territory for the patent protected good.’164 Distributors or other middlepersons will engage in 
arbitrage, until a law of one price predominates. 
165
 
   But, why would uniform price have adverse effect on pharmaceutical business? The answer is 
quite simple, according to Ramsey and Boiteux,  the most efficient way to cover some fixed cost 
of production is to implicitly tax those markets that will be least affected by higher 
prices, i.e. those with a lower elasticity of demand.
166
 Put differently, ‘the value of patent rights 
depends, to a certain extent, on “the scope for price discrimination within the area of 
exhaustion.’167 
   In order to fight intra brand competition pharmaceutical companies could be forced to 
introduce more harmonized price and by doing so deprive the possibility to the most efficient 
and fairest way for patent holders to charge different prices in different parts of the world market 
according to ability and willingness to pay and thus, this could have long-run effect on inter-
brand competition. 
5.2.2.3. Intra-brand competition v. Inter-brand competition 
The question is whether pharmaceutical companies are able to cope with inter-brand 
competition, when intra-brand competition is protected and facilitated? It is generally held that a 
producer who has to sustain competition with other producers ‘inter-brand competition’ will 
usually not be able to harm competition by vertically restricting  freedom of dealers to compete.   
On the contrary, it is assumed that such producers will structure their distribution systems in a 
way that their ability to compete with other producers is enhanced, as pharmaceutical companies 
try to do through dual pricing or supply limitation as illustrated in previous sections. Vertical 
restraints are therefore held to be efficient and pro-competitive, at least if the producer is not 
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market-dominant. This is why, nowadays, there is a trend to consider giving up the ban on 
vertical market partitioning along the borders of EU Member States.
168
 
   The same consideration is detected in AG Jacobs opinion on Syfait. He applied an analytical 
approach which came close to the general recommendation of the Commission for its more 
economic approach in balancing pro-competitive effects on inter-brand competition with the 
anticompetitive effects on intra-brand competition.
169
 Shortly, Jacobs applied a balancing 
approach, by comparing the effects on inter-brand and intra-brand competition, and finally 
recommended allowing the restraint on parallel trade in view of promoting inter-brand 
competition. A similar balancing approach had been applied by the GC in its GlaxoSmithKline 
decision.
170
 
   Thus, when one argues for the benefit of intra brand competition through parallel trade the 
implication of it on inter-brand competition should be taken into account, which leads to the next 
argument, particularly the effect of parallel trade on R&D. 
5.2.2.4. R&D and Dynamic efficiency losses 
The pharmaceutical industry is based on significant investments in innovation,
171
which is one of 
the main factors determining the competitiveness of a company in the sector.  Pharmaceutical 
research is long and costly. It takes 10 to 12 years and the average cost of researching and 
developing an entirely new medicinal product, is estimated at EUR 200 million.
172
 
   The size of such expenditures requires the companies operating in this sector to recoup R&D 
costs through a constant and consistent flow of profits, in order to preserve their incentive to 
invest in research in the long run.
173
  
   In this regard, Stuart Schweitzer notes that the ‘threat of cheaper versions of the patented drugs 
reentering the primary markets of the United States, Europe and Japan is serious.’174 The 
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research-based pharmaceutical industry’s ability to develop innovative new drugs is also 
jeopardized by the practice of “cherry-picking major products, those which have improved 
therapeutic benefits.”175 Parallel traders most often trade in “sure-bets,” or products just recently 
released that provide the bulk of profits for pharmaceutical companies. 
176
 
   Therefore, greater encouragement of parallel imports is likely to have an exaggerated effect on 
both ability and incentives to carry out desirable R&D.
177
 
   In light of foregoing, pharmaceutical companies, for instance GSK argued that parallel imports, 
could reduce the resources available for R&D, as could any other form of price competition. 
178
 
Therefore, through the elimination of profit losses caused by parallel trade, the company would 
have availed itself to fully exploit the value of its patent, thus stimulating further research and 
promoting dynamic efficiency and consumers' welfare.
179
  
   Total appropriation of all possible returns does not necessarily foster more innovation.
180
 Even 
though, it is difficult to establish the direct link between parallel trade and reduced investment in 
R&D such a possibility cannot be excluded either. Furthermore, the impact that parallel trade has 
on dynamic efficiency is not the same in all cases, and certain limitations on a property owner’s 
right to exclude competitors may have only a marginal effect on investment decisions.
181
Thus it 
appears more appropriate to say that, while parallel trade may limit incentives to innovate, the 
magnitude of that risk varies and should be assessed on a case-to-case basis. 
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5.3. Possible defence under 101 and 102 TFEU 
It has been shown that parallel trade might have an adverse impact not only on future R&D as 
such, but through declining the incentive to R&D might affect consumer welfare, though, this 
finding is not straightforward. In light of this consideration, let’s turn to the possible defence of 
the restriction of parallel trade within the scope of 101(3) and 102 TFEU by summing up the 
previously discussed case-law.  
   Nowadays, industrial economists tend to require consumer harm as evidence of anticompetitive 
conduct.
182
 This is due to the fact that consumer welfare and general welfare are held to be 
maximized at the same equilibrium of perfect competition.
183
 
5.3.1. Defence under Article 101(3) TFEU:  Efficiency gains 
The issue of striking a balance between the interests of different consumer groups was actually 
on the table in the Spanish GlaxoSmithKline case as discussed above. The GC noted that the 
Commission itself accepted the ambiguous impact of parallel trade in medicines on the welfare 
of final consumers. Unless parallel trade can operate dynamically on prices, it creates 
inefficiencies because the financial benefit occurs to the parallel trader rather than to the 
healthcare system or the patient. 
   Contrary to the Commission, the GC accepted GlaxoSmithKline contention that parallel trade 
reduces the company’s capacity to engage in inter-brand competition and that the dual pricing 
scheme would lead ‘to a gain in efficiency for inter-brand competition in so far as it will enable  
the undertakings capacity for innovation to be increased.’184 
   Full assessment of the efficiency argument is not an easy task though.  It involves addressing in 
detail the likelihood that a company would invest in R&D, a significant part of the increased 
funding that would result from its dual-pricing policy. This in turn may involve addressing such 
questions as the relative amount of funding that would be invested in marketing as opposed to 
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R&D; as well, the relative importance of marketing expenditure in raising awareness of a 
product emerging from the R&D pipeline.
185
 
   The GC case which in most way has been upheld by the ECJ shows the trend that actual effect 
on consumer welfare should be fully assessed in the legal and economic context under 101TFEU 
and it is not permissible for a competition authority to reject a claimant's Art.101(3) arguments 
without properly weighing up those arguments. This trend in light with Article 2 of Regulation 
1/2003
186
 places the burden on pharmaceutical companies to show the efficiency gains of such an 
anti competitive action.  
   Since so much detailed assessment is needed and very little can be taken for granted in the case 
of pharmaceutical sector, one thing is clear that the doors for the room of efficiency gains for 
pharmaceutical companies are opening slightly but visibly. 
5.3.2. Defence within Article 102 TFEU 
As AG Colomer suggested, accepting the idea of per se abuse of a dominant position under 102 
TFEU would run counter to the proposition and it is necessary to examine each case within the 
economic and legal context in which it arose. 
   Thus, it follows that the substantive test for the application of Article 102 TFEU should be 
based on the effect of the company's conduct on consumer welfare.
187
 Article 102 TFEU does 
not prohibit unilateral conduct of a market dominant undertaking, the challenge lies in finding 
the correct criterion to distinguish lawful ‘competition on the merits’, which might even result in 
the exclusion of inefficient competitors, from illegal abuse.
188
 Here, economists typically rely on 
consumer harm, since it is for the consumers that undertakings engage in competition in the first 
place and ‘it is only by requiring consumer harm that enforcers can avoid the fallacy of 
protecting competitors, instead of protecting competition.’189 
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   In considering the welfare implications of a conduct restricting parallel trade, it is necessary to 
consider two dimensions: the short-term harm to consumers (or losses in static efficiency) and 
the long-term benefits to consumers (or gains in dynamic efficiency). 
   Following the so-called “rule of reason” ‘standard, ex post static efficiency gains, maximized 
by an obligation to deal, should be weighed against the ex ante dynamic efficiency gains, which 
could be preserved by not imposing such a duty.’190  
   On this view, a pharmaceutical companies actions aiming to restrict parallel trade is an abuse 
of a dominant position when and where static losses prevail over dynamic gains, after the close 
assessment and conduction the proportionality test. 
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6. Conclusion 
The objective of this thesis was to examine the possible justifications of restraints on parallel 
trade by pharmaceutical companies within the ambit of the EU competition rules. In this regard 
the thesis analyzed the legal stand of parallel trade based on IPR exhaustion in the EU and the 
US. After the comparison, a conclusion was made that there is a different attitude to the legality 
of parallel trade in the two jurisdictions and this is incited by different market goals. 
   The main argument against the legality of restrictions on parallel trade in the EU context is the 
very objective of market integration which does not appear as an obstacle for illegality of parallel 
trade in the US. According to Article 3(1) of TEU the Union aims to promote the wellbeing of its 
people and to this end the EU establishes an internal market. This exemplifies that the internal 
market is at the heart of the Union. In addition, this is neatly tied to the EU’s choice to make 
regulatory integration, through price control in order to guarantee that the patient in poorer 
countries has access to medicines. However, this system is not considered by the CJEU as a 
decision against integration or opening the way to the restrictions on parallel trade which has 
been analyzed and illustrated by case-law in Chapter 3.1.1.  
   Old EC treaty had the Article 3(1) (g), which explicitly stated that the internal market included 
the system where competition is not distorted.  The Lisbon Treaty removed that Article. This can 
be seen as a step taken towards less formalistic approach and giving more emphasize to 
competition policy. However, one should bear in mind that even the Lisbon Treaty does not have 
Article 3(1) (g), the same wording is repeated in the Protocol for Internal market and 
Competition. By virtue that the protocol has the same legal binding nature this does not bring 
crucial change. Moreover, from the name of the protocol one could argue that this title 
furthermore, marries internal market and competition. In addition, the Lisbon Treaty introduced 
the provision about competences and in Article 3(1) (b) TFEU it states that the EU has an 
exclusive competence in establishing the competition rules for the functioning of the internal 
market. This indicates that the EU competition rules indeed play an important role in proper 
functioning of the internal market and moreover serve as a tool for the internal market. 
Therefore, this argument has been considered as a back line of the whole research, while 
assessing the accommodation of restrictions on parallel trade within the EU competition rules.  
   Chapter 4 analyzed the European Courts attitude towards the restriction on parallel trade within 
the EU Competition rules. It can be concluded from the case-law analysis that if protection of the 
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internal market without frontiers places obligation on the Member States to remove all obstacles 
to free movement of goods through the Article 34 TFEU, the same aim is achieved through 
competition rules.  They reach private parties-companies and prohibit the actions which are 
aimed to partition the market, by doing so competition rules enforce and protect the main goal of 
integration for the proper functioning of internal market.  
   Therefore, even after 50 years of European integration it is not yet time to give up this specific 
objective of competition law in favor of a pure efficiency approach.  
   However, the analysis conducted shows that the Courts and more AGs still consider efficiency 
gains of restriction on parallel trade. Since the protection of parallel trade is not itself the aim of 
the EU, rather it serves the goal of proper functioning of the internal market. Internal market is 
not the sole aim of the EU, but according to Article 3(3) TEU establishing competitive social 
market, which promotes the scientific and technological advancement, in order to achieve the 
well-being of its people is its aim as well. So, the EU aims to promote peace and well-being of 
its people and internal market is a tool for that. Such an understanding of the EU system would 
not be contrary to the new trend to seek the justification of the restrictions on parallel trades for 
the sake of consumer welfare through maintaining the incentive for R&D.  
   The pros and cons around the parallel trade were discussed in Chapter 5. The difficulties of 
achieving straightforward attitude towards the benefit or loses caused by parallel trade in 
pharmaceutical business were considered. This issue seems more complicated in research based 
pharmaceutical industry, the success of which is dependent on continued and long-run costly 
researches, requiring huge investment. However, it could be undermined by parallel trade 
through decreasing the profit and that would have a long-run implication on consumer welfare.  
Therefore, this is the main argument put forward by the pharmaceutical companies. 
   The analysis shows that the European Courts are aware of possible side effects of parallel trade 
in pharmaceutical industry and while applying the competition rules tend to consider the possible 
efficiency effects of anticompetitive actions. 
   In C-501/06 P GlaxoSmithKline the CJEU took more cautious approach and stated that 
competition laws are designed to protect not only the immediate interest of individual 
competitors or consumers, but also to protect the structure of the market and the competition as 
such. One could say that by doing so the CJEU rejects to consider pure effects on consumer and 
adds structure of the market and competition as such. 
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   Even though, the terms structure of the market and competition as such seem obscure, they 
mean more than explicitly stated. It can be understood that the CJEU rejects to consider only 
immediate effects on consumer, i.e. elimination of intra-brand competition having static 
efficiency effect on consumer through depriving the possibility of the price choice.  Moreover, 
the CJEU goes further and takes into account the long run effect on the market and competition 
as such.  Thus, the CJEU considers value of inter-brand competition and by doing so assesses the 
impact on the consumer well-fare beyond the immediate. 
   However, this does not mean that the pharmaceutical companies would be given the possibility 
to freely justify the restriction of parallel trade by simply relying on efficiency gains and the 
investments necessary for the R&D.  The Contribution of restrictive agreements to the promotion 
of innovation has to be shown, and there has to be a direct link between both. It is not sufficient 
to claim a general context between increased profits and stronger R&D activities. Therefore, it is 
not sufficient to say that without parallel imports the undertakings in question would earn higher 
profits which would be invested in R&D. In this regard, active and augmented use of Article 
101(3) TFEU could provide the safe harbor for the pharmaceutical companies.  
   The previous analysis show that the CJEU is not against considering the economic aspects of 
the case, moreover, if the direct link is proved by pharmaceutical companies, there is higher 
probability that the actions will survive the application 102TFEU, as has been stated  this Article 
does not considers as such a per se abuse of dominance.  
   On one hand, the pharmaceutical company does not need to prove long-run efficiency gains 
and can escape the competition rules if it designs  supply management system  in a way which 
does not amount the agreement as was  in Bayer.  On the other hand, more prudence is required 
if company is dominant, then supply management system may not have the same outcome as in 
Bayer.  However, when the company is dominant, following the case Sot Lélos, there is no need 
to defend under the rule of reason, if the pharmaceutical company refuses to supply orders which 
is out of ordinary. Though, the restrictions on supply should not go beyond what is strictly 
necessary, as well should also allow competition among wholesalers, including by allowing new 
wholesalers to enter the market. 
   These are important aspects to be considered by pharmaceutical companies when thinking of 
minimizing the risks of competition concerns. 
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   To sum up, promotion of innovation in pharmaceutical sector strengthens the overall 
competitiveness of the EU market.  In addition, it is obvious that the Commission is interested in 
the protection and promotion of this essential sector of the European economy, as proved in 
documents and proposals issued by it to this effect.  In this regard, the overall picture around the 
restrictions on parallel trade by pharmaceutical companies provides the room for justification 
within the EU competition rules. The trend from the Courts is that more economic analysis and 
the economic arguments about the side effects of parallel trade in long run are taken into 
account. This shows that the CJEU’s doors would open slowly and slightly for pharmaceutical 
companies argumentatively prayers, however only with high scrutiny and cautious from the 
CJEU side. 
   It means that when pharmaceutical company would prove efficiency gains and positive effects 
on consumer welfare of restraints on parallel trade, these actions would survive the application of 
competition rules. Moreover, taking into account consumer welfare considerations and linking it   
to the well being of people, would enhance the aim of internal market from a different angle; and 
by doing so the possible controversy between free movement of goods and restrictions on 
parallel trade would be overcome in particular cases. However this does not leads to a general 
approach of exempting the whole pharmaceutical sector, rather it is possible to justify only on a 
case by case basis.  
   Finally, one is clear that the CJEU seems more comfortable to take economic considerations 
into account and abandon pure legal approach in pharmaceutical industry. Therefore, it seems 
that interesting times lie ahead in terms of competition policy enforcement and advocacy in the 
pharmaceutical sector. At the very least, the Commission’s past focus on intra-brand competition 
may be expected to be complemented by a more nuanced multi-faceted approach aimed at inter-
brand competition to deliver enhanced consumer welfare to patients throughout the EU. 
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